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Abstract. DBSCAN is a well-known density-based clustering algorithm which offers advantages for
ﬁnding clusters of arbitrary shapes compared to partitioning and hierarchical clustering methods.
However, there are few papers studying the DBSCAN algorithm under the privacy preserving dis-
tributed data mining model, in which the data is distributed between two or more parties, and the
parties cooperate to obtain the clustering results without revealing the data at the individual parties.
In this paper, we address the problem of two-party privacy preserving DBSCAN clustering. We ﬁrst
propose two protocols for privacy preserving DBSCAN clustering over horizontally and vertically
partitioned data respectively and then extend them to arbitrarily partitioned data. We also provide
performance analysis and privacy proof of our solution.
Keywords: Privacy Preserving; DBSCAN; Clustering; Secure Multi-Party Computation; Distributed
Data
1 Introduction
Consider a scenario in which each hospital has its own database of medical records. If the
data from different hospitals can be shared, we can mine the data and extract more mean-
ingful results than just using partial data independently. However, since medical records
are subject to privacy and conﬁdentiality constraints, how to extract the knowledge from
the integrated data set without revealing one party’s data to other parties is the theme of
privacy preserving distributed data mining. Privacy preserving data mining, ﬁrst intro-
duced by Agrawal et al. [2] (using perturbation techniques) and Lindell et al. [16] (using
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)) techniques), allows different parties to cooperate
in the extraction of knowledge without any of the cooperating parties having to reveal
their individual data items. In this paper, for the convenience of analysis, we only focus on
the two-party privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) algorithm. However, the two-party
algorithm can be extended to multi-party cases.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 2012 Joint EDBT/ICDT Workshops
[17].
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Figure 1: Bob could decide that A is in the small gray region.
DBSCAN (Density Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise) [8] is a well-
known density-based clustering algorithm which offers several advantages compared to
partitioning and hierarchical clustering methods. First, DBSCAN does not require one to
specify the number of clusters in the data a priori, as opposed to k-means clustering algo-
rithm. Second, DBSCAN is better at ﬁnding arbitrarily shaped clusters and can even ﬁnd
a cluster completely surrounded by a different cluster. Finally, DBSCAN has a notion of
noise or outliers and requires just two parameters (Eps and Minpts in this paper) and is
mostly insensitive to the ordering of the points in the database. Conclusively, it is of prac-
tical importance to design distributed protocols DBSCAN based clustering in a distributed
environment with sensitive data.
Kumaretal. [14]proposedprotocolsfortheprivacypreservingdistributedDBSCANclus-
tering. However, the privacy proofs of their protocols do not strictly follow the deﬁnition
of privacy in the semi-honest model [10]. More importantly, it poses signiﬁcant privacy
risks of identifying individual records from other party. Considering a scenario as shown
in Figure 1. Bob has three records B1;B2;B3 and knows one of Alice’s record A is in their
neighborhood. So Bob knows that A is in the intersection of his three records’ neighbor-
hood (the gray area in Figure 1). It could happen that the intersection area is so small that
Bob could determine the location of the point A that is not far away from its true location.
In this paper, we present privacy preserving algorithms for DBSCAN clustering for hor-
izontally, vertically and arbitrarily partitioned data distributed between two parties. The
main contributions of our paper are:
1. We design a Multiplication Protocol (Subsection 4.1) based on Pailler’s Additive Ho-
momorphic cryptosystem [17].
2. We present a set of privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering protocols uti-
lizing the above multiplication protocol over horizontally (Subsection 4.2), vertically
(Subsection 4.3), and arbitrarily (Subsection 4.4) partitioned data [17]. Compared to
the existing work [8], the only information disclosed in our protocols is that Bob only
knows there is a record owned by Alice in B1;B2;B3’s neighborhood respectively.
However, Bob does not know whether those three records are the same or not. There-
fore, Bob can not determine whether there is a record owned by Alice in the small
gray region.
3. We further present a new protocol with enhanced privacy than the above protocols
(Section 5). Compared to the protocols in the preliminary version [17] which reveal
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 6 (2013)Privacy Preserving Distributed DBSCAN Clustering 71
the number of points from the other party in the neighborhood of a point when decid-
ing whether the point is a core point, we address this disclosure in this new protocol.
4. We present formal performance and privacy analysis and demonstrate that our pro-
tocols are efﬁcient in terms of communication and achieve adequate privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review some related work in Section
2. Section 3 introduces some background that will be used in this paper. The preliminary
algorithms for computing privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering are given in
Section4. Section5presentsthenewenhancedprotocolsaddressingthedisclosureproblem
in the previous protocols. Section 6 concludes the paper with directions for future work.
2 Related Work
Privacy preserving data mining, ﬁrst introduced by Agrawal et al. [2] and Lindell et al.
[16], could be roughly classiﬁed into two major categories: data mining on modiﬁed or
perturbed data [2] [9] [1] [15] and cooperative data mining on distributed private data [16]
[22] [13]. The initial idea of the former is to modify or perturb the data to mask private
information but in such a way that the perturbed data can be still mined. The key is how
to modify the data and how to recover the data mining result from the modiﬁed (“un-
private”) data.
The privacy preserving distributed data mining problem in the latter category is typi-
cally formulated as a secure multi-party computation problem [10]. Yao’s general protocol
for secure circuit evaluation [26] can be used to solve any two-party privacy preserving
distributed data mining problem in theory. However, since data mining problems usually
involve millions or billions of data items, the communication cost of this protocol renders it
impractical for these purposes. This is a good motivation to the search for problem speciﬁc
protocols that are efﬁcient in terms of communication complexity. Therefore, as Goldre-
ich points out in [10], we do not recommend using the solutions derived by these general
results in practice; special solutions should be developed for special cases or data mining
algorithms for efﬁciency reasons. In many cases, including our solution described in this
paper, the more efﬁcient solutions still make use of a general solution such as Yao’s, but
only to carry out a much smaller portion of the computation. The rest of the computation
uses other methods to ensure the privacy of the data. One such complementary approach
uses randomization techniques [7]. Although such solutions tend to be more efﬁcient than
cryptographic solutions, they are generally less private or less accurate.
DBSCAN [8] is a well-known density-based clustering algorithm for discovering clusters
in large spatial databases with noise. It is signiﬁcantly more effective in discovering clus-
ters of arbitrary shape than the partitioning methods such as the well known k-means [19]
and CLARANS [18] algorithm as well as hierarchical methods. Similar clustering algo-
rithms based on density are OPTICS [4] and DENCLUE [11]. While there are many privacy
preserving K-means algorithms [12] [23] [5], there is little literature considering the prob-
lem of privacy preserving distributed density-based clustering. A. Amirbekyan et al. [3]
and W. Xu et al. [24] only discussed the vertically partitioned data case. So far [14] is the
only both horizontally and vertically partitioned data work we are aware of but it did not
provide adequate privacy as we discussed above.
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3 Preliminaries
In this section, we brieﬂy review the DBSCAN clustering algorithm, and describe the con-
cept of horizontally, vertically and arbitrarily partitioned data. Some deﬁnitions borrowed
from cryptology, and two protocols that will be used in this paper are also given.
3.1 DBSCAN Algorithm
We brieﬂy review the DBSCAN algorithm. Details are described in [8]. DBSCAN is a
density-based algorithm which can detect arbitrary shaped clusters. The key idea is that
for each point of a cluster, the neighborhood of which within a given radius (Eps) has to
contain at least a minimum number (MinPts) of points, i.e. the density in the neighborhood
has to exceed some threshold. Therefore, the critical step in this algorithm is to decide
whether the distance between two points is less than or equal to Eps. It is an easy task if
two points are owned by one party. Otherwise, we need to develop a private protocol to
compute the distance between two points that are owned by two parties.
We illustrate several deﬁnitions in DBSCAN algorithm [8] that will be used in the next
Section.
Deﬁnition 1. (density-reachable) A point p is density-reachable from a point q w.r.t. Eps
and MinPts if there is a chain of points p1;:::;pn;p1 = q;pn = p such that pi+1 is directly
density-reachable from pi.
Deﬁnition 2. (density-connected) A point p is density-connected to a point q w.r.t. Eps
and MinPts if there is a point o such that both p and q are density-reachable from o w.r.t.
Eps and MinPts.
Deﬁnition 3. (cluster) Let D be a database of points. A cluster C w.r.t. Eps and MinPts is
a non-empty subset of D satisfying the following conditions:
1. 8 point p;q: if p 2 C and q is density-reachable from p w.r.t. Eps and MinPts, then
q 2 C. (Maximality)
2. 8 point p,q 2 C: p is density-connected to q w.r.t. Eps and MinPts. (Connectivity)
Deﬁnition 4. (noise) Let C1;:::;Ck be the clusters of the database D w.r.t. parameters Eps
and MinPts. Then we deﬁne the noise as the set of points in the database D not belonging
to any cluster Ci , i.e. noise =p 2 D j 8i : p = 2 Ci.
3.2 Partitioned Data
In the two-party distributed data setting, two parties (call them Alice and Bob) hold data
forming a (virtual) database consisting of their joint data. More speciﬁcally, the virtual
database D = fd1;d2;:::;dng consists of n records. Each record di has m values for m
attributes (di;1;di;2;:::;di;m).
There are three formats for partitioned data:
 Horizontally Partitioned Data: each party owns a subset of records with full at-
tributes (see Figure 2).
 Vertically Partitioned Data: each party owns all records with partial attributes (see
Figure 3).
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Figure 2: Horizontally partitioned data.
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Figure 3: Vertically partitioned data.
 Arbitrarily Partitioned Data [12]: mixture of horizontally and vertically partitioned
data (see Figure 4).
3.3 Privacy Properties
Our desired outcome is that clusters are computed on Alice and Bob’s joint data. Alice
should learn the cluster number (or the NOISE record) for each data record that she owns
completely, and Bob should learn the cluster number (or the NOISE record) for each data
record that he owns completely. For records that are split between Alice and Bob, they
should both learn the cluster number.
In an ideal world, Alice and Bob would have access to a trusted third party who could
perform the necessary calculations. Alice and Bob would securely send their data to this
trusted party, which would then compute the cluster to which each object is assigned using
the appropriate clustering algorithm, and send the desired information to the party that
owns the object. However, trusted third parties are hard to ﬁnd in the real world, and even
then, such trust may be misplaced. In this work, we do not rely on a third party. Instead,
we provide protocols by which Alice and Bob can carry out the functionality that would be
provided by the trusted third party without actually requiring such third party or requiring
the parties to send their data to each other.
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Figure 4: Arbitrarily partitioned data =vertically partitioned data + horizontally parti-
tioned data.
3.4 Two-party Computation
Atwo-partyprotocolproblem[10]iscastedbyspecifyingarandomprocessthatmapspairs
of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). We refer to such a process as a functionality
and denote it as f : f0;1g  f0;1g ! f0;1g  f0;1g, where f = (f1;f2). That is, for
every pair of inputs (x;y), the output pair is a random variable (f1(x;y);f2(x;y)) ranging
over pairs of strings. The ﬁrst party (with input x) wishes to obtain f1(x;y) and the second
party (with input y) wishes to obtain f2(x;y). We often denote such a functionality by
(x;y) 7! (f1(x;y);f2(x;y)).
3.5 Semi-honest Model
In any multi-party computation setting, a malicious adversary can always alter its input. In
the data mining setting, this fact can be very damaging since the adversary can deﬁne its in-
put to be the empty database. Then the output obtained is the result of the algorithm on the
other party’s database alone. For this work we assume that the adversary is semi-honest [10]
(also known as passive). That is, it correctly follows the protocol speciﬁcation, yet attempts
to learn additional information by analyzing the transcript of messages received during the
execution. We remark that although the semi-honest adversarial model is weaker than the
malicious model (where a party may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol speciﬁcation), it
is often a realistic one. This is because deviating from a speciﬁed program which may be
buried in a complex application is a non-trivial task. Further, the parties cooperate with
each other because they wish to mine the integrated data for their mutual beneﬁt.
3.6 Deﬁnition of Privacy in the Semi-honest Model
Intuitively, a protocol is private if whatever can be computed by a party participating in the
protocol can be computed based on its input and output only. This is formalized according
to the simulation paradigm. Loosely speaking, we require that a party’s view in a protocol
execution be simulative given only its input and output. This then implies that the parties
learn nothing from the protocol execution itself, as desired.
We begin with the following notations:
 Let f = (f1;f2) be a probabilistic, polynomial-time functionality and let
Q
be a two-
party protocol for computing f.
 The view of the ﬁrst (resp., second) party during an execution of
Q
on (x;y), denoted
by view
Q
1 (x;y)(resp., view
Q
2 (x; y)), is (x;r1;m1
1;:::;m1
t) (resp., (y;r2;m2
1;:::;m2
t)) where r1
(resp., r2) represents the outcome of the ﬁrst (resp., second) party’s internal coin tosses, and
m1
i (resp., m2
i ) represents the ith message it has received.
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 The output of the ﬁrst (resp., second) party during an execution of
Q
on (x;y) is denoted
by output
Q
1 (x;y) (resp., output
Q
2 (x;y)), and is implicit in the party’s view of the execution.
Deﬁnition 5. Privacy with Respect to Semi-Honest Behavior
For a functionality f, we say that
Q
privately computes f if there exist probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithms, denoted by S1 and S2, such that
f(S1(x;f1(x;y));f2(x;y))gx;y2f0;1g
c
f(view
Q
1 (x;y);output
Q
2 (x;y))gx;y2f0;1g; (1)
f(f1(x;y);S2(y;f2(x;y)))gx;y2f0;1g
c
 f(output
Q
1 (x;y);view
Q
2 (x;y))gx;y2f0;1g; (2)
where
c
 denotes computational indistinguishability.
Equations1and2statethattheviewofapartycanbesimulatedbyaprobabilisticpolynomial-
time algorithm given access to the party’s input and output only. We emphasize that the
adversary here is semi-honest and therefore the view is exactly according to the protocol
deﬁnition. See [10] for a full discussion.
Theorem 6. (Composition Theorem for the semi-honest model, two parties) [6]: Suppose that g is
privately reducible to f and that there exists a protocol for privately computing f. Then there exists
a protocol for privately computing g.
3.7 Paillier’s Additive Homomorphic Properties
We brieﬂy describe the Paillier’s additive homomorphic cryptosystem [20] and its homo-
morphic properties which will be used in our protocols.
Key generation
 Choose two large prime numbers p and q randomly and independently of each other such
that gcd(pq;(p   1)(q   1)) = 1.
 Compute n = pq and  = lcm(p   1;q   1).
 Select random integer g where g 2 Z
n2.
 Ensure n divides the order of g by checking the existence of the following modular multi-
plicative inverse:  = (L(g mod n2)) 1 mod n, where function L is deﬁned as L(u) = u 1
n .
 The public encryption key is (n;g) and private decryption key is (;u).
Encryption
 Let m be a plaintext to be encrypted where m 2 Zn.
 Select random r where r 2 Z
n.
 Compute ciphertext as: c = gmrn mod n2.
Decryption
 Ciphertext c 2 Z
n2.
 Compute plaintext: m = L(c mod n2) mod n.
Homomorphic properties
 Homomorphic addition of plaintexts:
D(E(m1;r1)E(m2;r2) mod n2) = (m1 + m2) mod n
 Homomorphic multiplication of plaintexts:
D(E(m1;r1)m2 mod n2) = m1m2 mod n
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3.8 Yao’s Millionaires’ Problem Protocol (YMPP)
We also brieﬂy describe the Yao’s Millionaires’ Problem Protocol (YMPP) which will be
used in our protocol. Alice has i millions and Bob has j millions, where 1 < i;j < n0 and n0
is the limit value of i;j. Yao’s millionaires’ problem [25] decides whether i < j, such that
this is also the only thing they know in the end. The protocol is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Yao’s Millionaires’ Problem Protocol
Input:Alice inputs i, Bob inputs j.
Output:Alice and Bob know whether i < j and cannot get any more information about the
wealth of the other party.
1: Bob picks a random N-bits integer, and computes privately the value of Ea(x); call the
result k.
2: Bob sends Alice the number k   j + 1;
3: Alice computes privately the values of yu = Da(k   j + u) for u = 1;2;:::;n0.
4: Alice generates a random prime p of N=2 bits, and computes the values zu = yu(mod
p) for all u; if all zu differ by at least 2 in the mod p sense, stop; otherwise generates
another random prime and repeat the process until all zu differ by at least 2; let p;zu
denote this ﬁnal set of numbers;
5: Alice sends the prime p and the following n0 numbers to B : z1;z2;:::;zi followed by
zi +1;zi+1 +1;:::;zn0 +1; the above numbers should be interpreted in the mod p sense.
6: Bob looks at the j-th number (not counting p) sent from Alice, and decides that i  j if
it is equal to x mod p, and i < j otherwise.
7: Bob tells Alice what the conclusion is.
4 Privacy Preserving Distributed DBSCAN Clustering
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce our Multiplication Protocol, then extend the single party
DBSCAN algorithm of [8] to privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering on hori-
zontally, vertically and arbitrarily partitioned data, respectively. We also provide analysis
of the communication complexity and privacy proofs of our protocols.
4.1 Multiplication Protocol
Multiplication Problem can be described as: Alice inputs private number x and Bob inputs
private number y, Alice (but not Bob) is to get the result u = xy + v, where v is a random
number known only to Bob. Alice should not be able to derive the value of y from u and
the execution of the protocol. Similarly Bob should not be able to get the result of xy or the
value of x.
Multiplication Problem is a special case of scalar products problems, but the known scalar
products protocols are not ﬁt for the Multiplication Problem. In our method, Paillier’s ad-
ditive homomorphic encryption schemes [20] are used to solve the Multiplication Problem.
First, Alice generates a key pair. Then, both Alice and Bob transform their inputs to positive
integers. After that, Alice sends the disguised data and the public key to Bob, Bob repeats
multiplying the disguised data and adds a random number to disguise it, then returns it to
Alice. Finally, Alice can use the private key to decode the value and get the desired result
(details are given in Algorithm 2).
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Algorithm 2 Multiplication protocol
Input:Alice inputs x, Bob inputs y.
Output:Alice gets u = xy + v where v is a random number known to Bob
only.
1: Alice generates a pair keys (EA;DA) in homomorphic encryption schemes.
2: Alice and Bob collaborate to select a random r 2 Z
n.
3: Alice sends EA(x;r), EA and r to Bob.
4: Bob generates a random v.
5: Bob computes u0 = (EA(x;r))y  EA(v;r).
6: Bob sends u0 to Alice.
7: Alice computes u = DA(u0).
4.1.1 Correctness Proof
u0 = (EA(x;r))y  EA(v;r)
Based on the Pallier’s homomorphic properties,
u = DA(u0) = DA((EA(x;r)y  EA(v;r)) = xy + v
Lemma 7. Multiplication Protocol is secure.
Proof. We start by presenting a simulator for the Alice’s view. In the protocol, the only
information Alice received from Bob is the u0 in Step 6. Alice can simulate the y and v
by y0 and v0 generated from a single random number with uniform random distribution.
That is, on Alice’s view, the simulated view (EA(x;r))y
0
 EA(v0;r) is computationally
indistinguishable from the u0 that Alice had received in Step 6.
We now turn to the Bob’s view. Bob receives an encryption key EA and a encrypted value
EA(x). Bob can simulate the encryption key by generating a single random number from
a uniform random distribution and the encrypted value can also be simulated simply by
generating a random from an uniform distribution.
The simulator for both runs in linear time, which meets the requirement of a polynomial
time simulation.
4.2 Privacy Preserving Distributed DBSCAN Clustering over Horizon-
tally Partitioned Data
Distance protocol for horizontally partitioned data. We ﬁrst present a distance protocol
(HDP) for evaluating the distance between two horizontally split records. Consider the
horizontally partitioned data as shown in Figure 2. Let dy (l + 1  y  n) denote one
record of Bob and dx (1  x  l) denote one record of Alice. The purpose of this protocol
is to let Alice know whether dist(dx;dy) is smaller than Eps, without obtaining any knowl-
edge about Bob’s dy;1;dy;2;:::;dy;m and Bob could not obtain any knowledge about Alice’s
dx;1;dx;2;:::;dx;m. We can evaluate whether dist(dx;dy)2 < Eps2, so that dist(dx;dy) < Eps
can be obtained.
(dist(dx;dy))2 = (dy;1   dx;1)2 + (dy;2   dx;2)2 + ::: + (dy;m   dx;m)2
=
Owned by Alice
z }| {
d2
x;1 + d2
x;2 + ::: + d2
x;m +
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Owned by Alice and Bob
z }| {
d2
y;1 + d2
y;2 + ::: + d2
y;m   2(dx;1dy;1 + ::: + dx;mdy;m)
For the part owned by Alice and Bob,
d2
y;1 + d2
y;2 + ::: + d2
y;m   2(dx;1dy;1 + ::: + dx;mdy;m)
Alice generates m random numbers r1;r2;:::;rm such that
r1 + r2 + ::: + rm = 0
then
(d2
y;1 + d2
y;2 + ::: + d2
y;m)   2fdx;1dy;1 + ::: + dx;mdy;mg
= (d2
y;1 + d2
y;2 + ::: + d2
y;m)   2fdx;1dy;1 + r1 + ::: + dx;mdy;m + rmg
Alice and Bob use the Multiplication Protocol to let Bob get dx;1dy;1+r1+:::+dx;mdy;m+rm.
Then Alice and Bob use the Protocol YMPP to decide whether dist(dx;dy)2  Eps2.
Lemma 8. Protocol HDP is secure.
Proof. Besides the Protocol YMPP, the only communication is that Alice sends r1;r2; :::;rm
to Bob. In Bob’s view, he could simulate the r0
1;r0
2;:::;r0
m by generating m random numbers
from a uniform random distribution. The simulator runs in linear time, which meets the
requirement for a polynomial time simulation.
4.2.1 DBSCAN Algorithm for Horizontally Partitioned Data
Algorithm 3 DBSCAN(SetOfPointsOfAlice, SetOfPointsOfBob, Eps, MinPts)
1: Party Alice DOES:
2: //SetOfPointsOfAlice is UNCLASSIFIED
3: ClusterId:=nextId(NOISE);
4: For i FROM 1 TO SetOfPointsOfAlice.size DO
5: Point:=SetOfPointsOfAlice.get(i);
6: IF Point.ClusterId=UNCLASSIFIED THEN
7: IF ExpandCluster(SetOfPointsOfAlice, SetOfPointsOfBob, PointOfAlice, PointOfBob, ClusterId, Eps,
MinPts) THEN
8: ClusterId:=nextId(ClsuterId);
9: END IF;
10: END IF;
11: END FOR;
12: END;
13: Party B DOES: repeats step 1 to 12 by replacing Alice for Bob and Bob for Alice.
The details of the DBSCAN algorithm for horizontally partitioned data are given in Algo-
rithm 3. SetOfPointsOfAlice is either the completed database of Alice’s or a discovered
cluster from a previous run of Alice. Eps and MinPts are the global density parame-
ters. A call of SetOfPointsOfAlice. regionQuery (PointOfAlice, Eps) returns the Eps-
Neighborhood of PointOfAlice in SetOfPointsOfAlice as a list of points. The function
SetOfPointsOfAlice. get(i) returns the i-th element of SetOfPointsOfAlice. The most
important function used by DBSCAN is ExpandCluster which is presented in Algorithm 4.
SetOfPointsOfBobPermutation is SetOfPointsOfBob. But in each iteration, the points’
order is permutated randomly. Therefore, Alice only knows there is a point of Bob (but
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does not know which point of Bob) in neighborhood of one of her points. In this way, the
situation in Figure 1 can be avoided. What should be noted is that in Steps 3 and 13, only
Alice knows whether the point in SetOfPointsOfBobPermutation is seed. Otherwise,
Bob could decide Alice in a small intersection region as we argued in Figure 1. Explain
above again by replacing Alice for Bob and Bob for Alice.
Algorithm 4 ExpandCluster(SetOfPointsOfAlice, SetOfPointsOfBob, PointOfAlice,
PointOfBob, ClusterId, Eps, MinPts) : Boolean
1: Party Alice DOES:
2: seedsA:=SetOfPointsOfAlice.regionQuery(PointOfAlice,Eps);
3: seedsB:=SetOfPointsOfBobPermutation.regionQuery(PointOfAlice,Eps);//Alice and Bob cooperatively use Protocol HDP
4: IF seedsA.size+seedsB.size<MinPts THEN
5: SetOfPointsofAlice.changeClusterId(PointOfAlice,NOISE);
6: RETURN False;
7: ELSE
8: SetOfPointsOfAlice.changeClusterIds(seedsA,ClusterId);
9: seedsA.delete(PointOfAlice);
10: WHILE seedsA 6= Empty DO
11: currentP:=seedsA.ﬁrst();
12: resultA:=SetOfPointsOfAlice.regionQuery(currentP,Eps);
13: resultB:=SetOfPointsOfBobPermutation.regionQuery(currentP,Eps);//Alice and Bob cooperatively use Protocol HDP
14: IF resultA.size+resultB.sizeMinPts THEN
15: FOR i FROM 1 TO resultA.size DO
16: resultAP:=resultA.get(i);
17: IF resultAP.ClusterId IN fUNCLASSIFIED,NOISEg THEN
18: IF resultAP.ClusterId=UNCLASSIFIED THEN
19: seedsA.append(resultAP);
20: END IF;
21: SetOfPointsOfAlice.changeClusterId(resultAP,ClusterId);
22: END IF; //UNCLASSIFIED or NOISE
23: END FOR;
24: END IF; //result.sizeMinPts
25: seedsA.delete(currentP);
26: END WHILE; //seedsA 6= Empty
27: RETURN True;
28: END IF;
29: END; //ExpandCluster
30: Party B DOES: repeats step 1 to 29 by replacing Alice for Bob and Bob for Alice.
4.2.2 Communication Complexity and Privacy
For each record di (1  i  n), it has m components. Assume that each component is
represented by c1 bits. Communication is involved when the two parties are engaged in
the Multiplication Protocol to judge the core point. The communication complexity of each
Multiplication Protocol is O(c1). Assume that each number in Protocol YMPP is repre-
sented by c2 bits. Hence, it requires a communication of O(c1ml(n l)+c2n0l(n l)) bits to
execute the algorithm, where n0 = juj and l is the number of records owned by one party.
Theorem 9. Algorithm 3 privately computes the privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN cluster-
ing over horizontally partitioned data assuming semi-honest, revealing the number of points from
the other party in the neighborhood of this point.
Proof. Step 3 and Step 13 are the only two steps of Algorithm 4 requiring communication.
As Lemma 8 has been proved that protocol HDP is private, by applying the composition
theorem (Theorem 6), we can conclude that the privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN
clustering over horizontally partitioned data is private.
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4.3 Privacy Preserving Distributed DBSCAN Clustering over Vertically
Partitioned Data
Distance protocol for vertically partitioned data. We ﬁrst present a distance protocol
(VDP) for evaluating the distance between two vertically split records. Consider the verti-
cally partitioned data as shown in Figure 3. Let dy denote one record and dy;1;dy;2;:::;dy;l
are owned by Alice while dy;l+1;dy;l+2;:::;dy;m are owned by Bob. Let dx (x 6= y) denote
another record and dx;1;dx;2;:::;dx;l owned by Alice while dx;l+1;dx;l+2;:::;dx;m are owned
by Bob. The purpose of this protocol is to let Alice and Bob know whether dist(dx;dy)
smaller than Eps. At the same time, Alice (Bob) knows nothing about Bob’s (Alice’s) data,
respectively. In order to determine
(dist(dx;dy))2 =
Owned by Alice
z }| {
(dx;1   dy;1)2 + ::: + (dx;l   dy;l)2 +
Owned by Bob
z }| {
(dx;l+1   dy;l+1)2 + ::: + (dx;m   dy;m)2 Eps2
Bob obtained
Eps2   f(dx;l+1   dy;l+1)2 + ::: + (dx;m   dy;m)2g
then use Protocol YMPP, Alice and Bob could decide whether dist(dx;dy)  Eps.
4.3.1 DBSCAN Algorithm for Vertically Partitioned Data
Algorithm 5 DBSCAN(SetOfPoints, Eps, MinPts)
1: //SetOfPoints is UNCLASSIFIED
2: ClusterId:=nextId(NOISE);
3: For i FROM 1 TO SetOfPoints.size DO
4: Point:=SetOfPoints.get(i);
5: IF Point.ClusterId=UNCLASSIFIED THEN
6: IF ExpandCluster(SetOfPoints, Point, ClusterId, Eps, MinPts) THEN
7: ClusterId:=nextId(ClsuterId);
8: END IF
9: END IF
10: END FOR
11: END
The details of the DBSCAN algorithm for vertically partitioned data are given in Algo-
rithm 5. SetOfPoints is either the completed database or a discovered cluster from a previ-
ousrun. EpsandMinPtsaretheglobaldensityparameters. AcallofSetOfPoints:regionQuery(Point;Eps)
returns the Eps-Neighborhood of Point in SetOfPoints as a list of points. The function
SetOfPoints:get(i) returns the i-th element of SetOfPoints. The most important function
used by DBSCAN is ExpandCluster which is presented in Algorithm 6.
4.3.2 Communication Complexity and Privacy
For each record di, it has m components. Communication is involved when the two parties
are engaged in the Protocol YMPP to judge the core point. Assume that each number in
Protocol YMPP is represented by c2 bits. The communication complexity of each YMPP is
O(c2n0) where n0 = juj and there are O(n2) times of executing YMPP if we implement DB-
SCAN without spatial index. Hence, it requires a communication of O(c2n0n2) bits totally.
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Algorithm 6 ExpandCluster(SetOfPoints, Point, ClusterId, Eps, MinPts) : Boolean
1: seeds:=SetOfPoint.regionQuery(Point,Eps); //Alice and Bob cooperatively use Protocol VDP.
2: IF seeds.size<MinPts THEN //no core points
3: SetOfPoints.changeClusterId(Point,NOISE);
4: RETURN False;
5: ELSE
6: SetOfPoints.changeClusterIds(seeds,ClusterId);
7: seeds.delete(Point);
8: WHILE seeds 6= Empty DO
9: currentP:=seeds.ﬁrst();
10: result:=SetOfPoints.regionQuery(currentP,Eps); //Alice and Bob cooperatively use Protocol VDP.
11: IF result.sizeMinPts THEN
12: FOR i FROM 1 TO result.size DO
13: resultP:=result.get(i);
14: IF resultP.ClusterId IN fUNCLASSIFIED, NOISEg THEN
15: IF resultP.ClusterId=UNCLASSIFIED THEN
16: seeds.append(resultP);
17: END IF;
18: SetOfPoints.changeClusterId(resultP, ClusterId);
19: END IF; //UNCLASSIFIED or NOISE
20: END FOR;
21: END IF; //result.sizeMinPts
22: seeds.delete(currentP);
23: END WHILE; //seeds 6= Empty
24: RETURN True;
25: END IF;
26: END; //ExpandCluster
Theorem 10. Algorithm 5 privately computes the privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clus-
tering over horizontally partitioned data assuming semi-honest, revealing the number of points in
the neighborhood of this point.
Proof. The key privacy of the algorithm 6 is the comparison of dist(dx;dy) with Eps. This
is guaranteed by Protocol YMPP. By applying the composition theorem (Theorem 6), we
can conclude that the privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering over vertically
partitioned data is secure. The only information revealed is the output which must be
known by Alice and Bob.
4.4 Privacy Preserving Distributed DBSCAN Clustering Algorithm over
Arbitrarily Partitioned Data
In arbitrarily partitioned data, there is not necessarily a simple pattern of how data are
shared between the parties. For each record di (1  i  n), Alice knows the values for
a subset of the attributes, and Bob knows the values for the remaining attributes. That is,
each di is partitioned into disjointed subsets Alicedi and Bobdi so that Alice knows Alicedi
and Bob knows Bobdi. Although extremely patchworked data is infrequent in practice, the
generality of this model can make it better suited to practical settings in which data may be
mostly, but not completely, vertically or horizontally partitioned.
As discussed in subsection 3.1, the key of DBSCAN is to judge distfdi;djg  Eps for two
records dx;dy owned by Alice and Bob, respectively. For example, in Figure 4, the problem
is to let Alice and Bob cooperate to decide
V ertically partitioned
z }| {
(A2;1   A1;1)2 + (B2;2   B1;2)2 +
Horizontally partitioned
z }| {
(B2;3   A1;3)2 + (B2;4   A1;4)2 Eps2
For the vertically partitioned data, (A2;1   A1;1)2 = Alicev is owned by Alice and (B2;2  
B1;2)2 = Bobv is owned by Bob. For the horizontally partitioned data, we could process
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them using the Protocol HDP. That is, the horizontally partitioned data could be divided
into data owned by Alice (Aliceh) and data owned by Bob (Bobh). Then Alice and Bob use
Protocol HDP to let Bob get (B2;3   A1;3)2 + (B2;4   A1;4)2 = Bobh. Along with Bobv, Bob
knows Bobh + Bobv. Since Alice knows Alicev, Alice and Bob could decide distfdi;djg 
Eps by using Protocol YMPP.
Sincethearbitrarilypartitioneddatacouldbedecomposedintohorizontallyandvertically
partitioned data, with Theorem 6, the algorithm for the arbitrarily partitioned data is the
combination of algorithms for horizontally and vertically partitioned data. Hence, we do
not repeat the algorithm here.
5 Enhanced Protocol of Privacy Preserving DBSCAN Clus-
tering over Horizontally Partitioned Data
In this section, we present an enhanced protocol with improved privacy for the protocol in
Subsection 4.2. As it is stated in Theorem 9, the privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN
clustering algorithm over horizontally partitioned data reveals the number of points in
the neighborhood of a point. This enhanced protocol only reveals whether the number
of the other party’s points in his/her point’s neighborhood is greater than Minpts minus
jjhis/her points in this point’s neighborhoodjj.
If Alice wants to decide whether the point is a core point, she only needs to know the
distance between kth smallest Dist2fA;Big’s Bi and A is less than or equal to Eps, where
k equals to MinPts minus jjher points in this point’s neighborhoodjj. Hence, this problem
is decomposed into two sub-problems. One is how to compare the distances securely. The
other one is how to ﬁnd the kth order statistic.
For how to compare the distances securely, assume Alice has one point A and Bob has n
points B1;B2;:::;Bn. The distance between Alice A and Bob Bi;1  i  n is:
Dist2fA;Big = (A1   Bi1)2 + (A2   Bi2)2 + ::: + (Am   Bim)2
= (A2
1 + A2
2 + ::: + A2
m)   (2A1Bi1 + 2A2Bi2 + ::: + 2AmBim) + (B2
i1 + B2
i2 + ::: + B2
im)
= (A2
1 +A2
2 +:::+A2
m; 2A1; 2A2;:::; 2Am;1)(1;Bi1;Bi2;:::;Bim;B2
i1 +B2
i2 +:::+B2
im)
Then use the Multiplication Protocol,
u1 = Dist2fA;B1g + v1
u2 = Dist2fA;B2g + v2

un = Dist2fA;Bng + vn
Alice knows u1;u2;:::;un and Bob knows v1;v2;:::;vn. Alice and Bob could use the Protocol
YMPP to decide whether DistfA;Big is greater than DistfA;Bjg as follows, where 1  i 6=
j  n.
DistfA;Big   DistfA;Bjg = (v1   u1)   (v2   u2) = (v1   v2)   (u1   u2)
Alice and Bob could use the Protocol YMPP to decide whether (v1 v2) (u1 u2) is greater
than 0, i.e., whether DistfA;Big is greater than DistfA;Bjg.
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Then this problem turns to how to ﬁnd the kth smallest DistfA;Big;1  i  n in an
array. We illustrate two different algorithms. The ﬁrst algorithm is appropriate when the
k is small. The algorithm scans the DistfA;Big;1  i  n, the ﬁrst iteration ﬁnds the
smallest DistfA;Big;1  i  n, then deletes the DistfA;Bsmallestg and iteratively to ﬁnd
the smallest in the rest of DistfA;Big;i 6= smallest. So the iteration continues until ﬁnding
the kth smallest number. The time complexity is O(kn), which is a good time complexity
for a small k. Though k is often very small, we here also illustrate an algorithm appropriate
when the k is greater, quick sorted based algorithm [21]. The worst time complexity is just
like that of quick sort (n2). The balanced time complexity is O(n + n=2 + n=4 + ::: + 1) =
O(n).
When Alice knows the kth smallest Dist2fA;Big’s Bi. Alice and Bob could use the Proto-
colYMPPtodecidewhetherDistfA;BigissmallerthanorequaltoEps. IftheDistfA;Big 
Eps, then the point A is a core point. The entire protocols are as follows (Algorithm 7):
Algorithm 7 DBSCAN(SetOfPointsOfAlice, SetOfPointsOfBob, Eps, MinPts)
1: Party Alice DOES:
2: //SetOfPointsOfAlice is UNCLASSIFIED
3: ClusterId:=nextId(NOISE);
4: For i FROM 1 TO SetOfPointsOfAlice.size DO
5: Point:=SetOfPointsOfAlice.get(i);
6: IF Point.ClusterId=UNCLASSIFIED THEN
7: IF EnhancedExpandCluster(SetOfPointsOfAlice, PointOfAlice, ClusterId, Eps, MinPts) THEN
8: ClusterId:=nextId(ClsuterId);
9: END IF;
10: END IF;
11: END FOR;
12: END;
13: Party B DOES: repeats step 1 to 12 by replacing Alice for Bob and Bob for Alice.
Algorithm 8 EnhancedExpandCluster(SetOfPointsOfAlice, SetOfPointsOfBob, PointOfAl-
ice, PointOfBob, ClusterId, Eps, MinPts) : Boolean
1: Party Alice DOES:
2: IF PointOfAlice is not a core point THEN//Use Updated Protocol.
3: SetOfPointsofAlice.changeClusterId(PointOfAlice,NOISE);
4: RETURN False;
5: ELSE
6: SetOfPointsOfAlice.changeClusterIds(seedsA,ClusterId);
7: seedsA.delete(PointOfAlice);
8: WHILE seedsA 6= Empty DO
9: currentP:=seedsA.ﬁrst();
10: IF currentP is a core point THEN //Use Updated Protocol.
11: FOR i FROM 1 TO resultA.size DO
12: resultAP:=resultA.get(i);
13: IF resultAP.ClusterId IN fUNCLASSIFIED,NOISEg THEN
14: IF resultAP.ClusterId=UNCLASSIFIED THEN
15: seedsA.append(resultAP);
16: END IF;
17: SetOfPointsOfAlice.changeClusterId(resultAP,ClusterId);
18: END IF; //UNCLASSIFIED or NOISE
19: END FOR;
20: END IF; //result.sizeMinPts
21: seedsA.delete(currentP);
22: END WHILE; //seedsA 6= Empty
23: RETURN True;
24: END IF;
25: END; //ExpandCluster
26: Party B DOES: repeats step 1 to 29 by replacing Alice for Bob and Bob for Alice.
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 6 (2013)84 Jinfei Liu, Li Xiong, Jun Luo, Joshua Zhexue Huang
5.1 Communication Complexity and Privacy
For each record di(1  i  n), it has m components. Assume that each component is
represented by c1 bits. Communication is involved when the two parties engage in the
Multiplication Protocol to ﬁnish Alice and Bob’s secret sharing DistfA;Big. The commu-
nication complexity of each Multiplication Protocol is O(c1). Assume that each number
in Protocol YMPP is represented by c2 bits. In order to ﬁnd the kth smallest distance and
compare whether the distance is greater than Eps, we need O(l(n   l)c2n0) bits to execute,
where n0 = juj and l is the number of records owned by one party. Hence, the entire proto-
col requires O(c1ml(n   l) + c2n0l(n   l)) to execute.
Theorem 11. Algorithm 7 privately computes the privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clus-
tering over horizontally partitioned data assuming semi-honest revealing whether the number of
other party’s points in his/her point’s neighborhood is greater than Minpts minus jjhis/her points
in this point’s neighborhoodjj.
Proof. Step 2 and Step 10 are the only two steps of Algorithm 8 requiring communication.
As Protocol YMPP and Multiplication Protocol have been proved private, by applying the
composition theorem (Theorem 6), we can conclude that the updated privacy preserving
distributed DBSCAN clustering over horizontally partitioned data is private.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we provide efﬁcient privacy preserving algorithms for DBSCAN clustering
over the setting of horizontally, vertically and arbitrarily partitioned data, respectively. In
the future, it will be interesting to see whether we can extend our method to other privacy
preserving distributed data mining algorithms.
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